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**SECRET/NFD/CD/BUO--SECURITY CONDITIONS  
FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER'S VISIT TO THE  
UK AND THE MIDDLE EAST 01 OF 01**

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Directorate of Intelligence  
March 3, 1975

**MICROFILMED**

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Security Conditions for Secretary Kissinger's  
Visit to the United Kingdom and the Middle East

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2. Throughout his trip, the Secretary will be under a greater than usual threat from Palestinian extremists. We regard George Habbash's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Ahmad Jabril's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), and Salah Khalaf's Black September Organization as the most likely sources of organized attempts against the Secretary's mission. Fedayeen splinter groups based in Libya and Iraq also pose a potential threat. Many Palestinians now regard themselves as being in a last-ditch defensive position as a result of the decline in their influence since the Rabat Conference and of the more forthcoming attitudes adopted by Presidents Asad and Sadat.

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3. UNITED KINGDOM: 

Local press treatment

of the Secretary's travels has been generally favorable. UK police and security elements responsible for identifying and controlling terrorism and other threats are believed to be highly experienced and capable of dealing effectively with any hostile action likely to arise.

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4. EGYPT:

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A report from a US official who made a personal tour of the Aswan area and talked with government officials there reflects no indication of any potential threat to the Secretary's security.

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5. ISRAEL: As of March 3, there were no known threats specifically directed against the Secretary. The security situation in Israel and the West Bank has not deteriorated since the early February visit of the Secretary. The fact that the whereabouts of the Secretary when he remains overnight in Israel, i.e., the King David Hotel, is widely known

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The unpredictability of the Secretary's comings and goings also makes plotting difficult. A unilateral act by a resident or a third-country national without any previous record of political activism or mental instability is always possible.

6. Bombing incidents, particularly those which have occurred in the vicinity of the King David Hotel, continue to be a cause of concern as they clearly demonstrate the capability of the terrorists to operate in the central part of the city. There is no evidence, however, that these incidents are directed toward the Secretary. By and large, the bombs have been relatively small and placed in locations where their effect has been more psychological than lethal. Nevertheless, the possibility of the Secretary's party becoming accidental victims of such terrorism does exist.

7. SYRIA: As of March 3, there was no adverse information affecting the security of the Secretary during his trip. It is anticipated that the Syrian authorities will impose strict security measures as well as surveillance and control of elements which reject a peaceful Middle East settlement and of known or suspect members of the "Arab Communist Organization." General security conditions will continue to be favorable as a result of the disengagement along the Syrian-Israeli front.

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8. While there is no indication of any such action specifically directed against the Secretary, [REDACTED] PFLP circles in Beirut were talking about a plan to assassinate the US ambassador in Lebanon.



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